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What role for local government in Sanitation promotion? Lessons from Tanzania  
Abstract  
Progress in rural access to sanitation is far behind agreed targets, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. As 
a result, new policies are being defined, which shift the role of public investment from infrastructure 
to sanitation promotion, and give the responsibility of service delivery to local government. This 
paper analyzes the role that local governments can have in sanitation promotion in this new 
framework. The implementation of the National Sanitation Campaign in Tanzania is analyzed using 
the Problem Driven Governance and Political Economy methodology. Results show that direct 
implementation enhances local governments´ commitment, but that not all functions carried out are 
suited to their capacities, motivations and constraints. The challenges identified emerge as a 
combination of technical weaknesses in the implementation of the adopted methodologies, the 
political economy of local governments, and the economic and social particularities of rural areas, 
which are similar to other countries across the region. Recommendations for a more effective service 
delivery model are made, balancing the role of local government between direct execution, 
coordination and supportive supervision. The fact of having a government programme with some 
direct implementation can bring about important differences in the national ownership of, and 
interest in rural sanitation, which are greatly needed.  
 
Keywords : Rural Sanitation , Local Government, Policy , Governance; Political Economy,  Africa, 
Tanzania 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. The sanitation crisis and the paradigm shift  
Today, 2,500 million people- 35% of the world’s population- do not have access to basic 
sanitation1.The target for Sanitation in the Millennium Development Goals, which aimed to halve the 
proportion of people without basic access for 2015 will not be met (WHO/UNICEF, 2012). Sanitation 
has been a low priority for both official development assistance (ODA) and international investments 
over the last decades (Jimenez and Perez-Foguet, 2009). But lack of financing is not the sole reason 
for the sanitation crisis.  In the past, conventional public finance in sanitation had generally focused 
on subsidies for household and public toilets, and grants for urban sewerage and solid waste 
systems. Subsidies proved to be an ineffective strategy, since they failed to generate demand, do not 
stimulate innovation for low price products, and have not been able to address the needs of the 
poor; success has been limited to the amount of subsidized facilities (Cairncross et al, 2010). In 
addition, responsibilities in sanitation are fragmented among different sectors, which increases the 
complexity of public governance and the risk of administrative struggles over power and 
responsibility (Carlei et al 2012).The biggest deficit of access is found in the rural areas, where seven 
out of ten people without improved sanitation live. Of the world’s regions, Sub-Saharan Africa has 
the lowest rural coverage of sanitation (23%), and made the poorest progress in the last twenty 
years, only 4% increase in coverage (WHO/UNICEF 2012). In response to this appalling situation, 
sanitation has gained political momentum and 31 of the countries in the Sub Saharan region report 
having a rural sanitation policy drafted or gazetted in 2011 (WHO, 2012).   
Two major processes emerge from those new policies: first there is a paradigm shift in the service 
delivery mechanisms: governments will invest in sanitation promotion (rather than in infrastructure), 
while the households themselves must pay for the toilet. The public officials are no longer managing 
substantial amounts of funds (previously subsidies) to choose some villages and provide funds for the 
construction of “demonstration” latrines for a number of beneficiaries; now they need to use 
different methodologies to raise awareness among villagers on the need to invest in sanitation, while 
ensuring that affordable and appropriate technical solutions are within their reach, with the support 
of private service providers. The type of activities carried out by the government is thus completely 
different, combines very different disciplines and requires different capacities in place. This shift in 
rural sanitation, from a public works perspective to a public health one, has in many cases led to the 
transfer of responsibilities between departments or even ministries. Secondly the policies have 
placed the greatest part of responsibility for service provision at local government level, which needs 
to cope with these challenges under the chronic lack of resources and qualified staff (Wunsch, 2001).   
The combination of these processes (new approach, change of governmental responsibilities and 
decentralized service delivery) poses a formidable challenge to local governments. Despite the 
importance of this aspect from the practitioner’s point of view, the role of local government in this 
new service delivery approach has received very little research attention.  The recent history of the 
rural water sector shows us what should be avoided: over-emphasis on communities as free-standing 
entities, virtually ignoring the role of local government, is partly responsible for the serious 
                                                          
1 By basic sanitation we refer to excreta disposal facilities.  
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sustainability problem of rural water services across the region (Harvey and Reed, 2007; Jiménez and 
Pérez-Foguet, 2010, 2011, 2011b). Public bodies must learn to assist effectively in bringing sanitation 
to all (Cairncross, 2003). This paper is a step towards this learning process. The implementation of 
the National Sanitation Campaign (NSC) in Tanzania, a programme aimed at increasing national 
household sanitation coverage by 15% in three years, is used as a case study.  
1.2. The new approach in sanitation promotion  
The general failure of the previous intervention model based on public subsidies to infrastructure 
fostered the impulse to adopt other approaches to develop rural sanitation. Basically, two can be 
described (Peal et al, 2010):  
 Community–wide approaches, or “total sanitation” approaches, which aim at a complete 
change in the behaviour of the community as a whole, and not in individual household 
behaviour. They are inspired in the Community-Led total Sanitation (CLTS) approach which 
aims to achieve and sustain an “open defecation free (ODF)” status for the community. CLTS 
entails the facilitation of the community’s analysis of their sanitation profile, their practices 
of defecation and the consequences through a “triggering” exercise, leading to collective 
action and peer control to become ODF (Kar, 2003). It promotes community based 
innovation for the construction of latrines, which might not necessarily be improved2.  
 Marketing of Sanitation Goods and Services, based on the social marketing concept (the use 
of marketing strategies and techniques to achieve a social goal). For sanitation promotion, 
social marketing covers both demand and supply. It sees potential sanitation users as clients 
who need to be motivated to invest in a latrine; and the services and products must be 
available at an affordable price in the right place (Cairncross, 2004).  
 
However, these approaches are not free of challenges. Research on the results of CLTS at scale in in 
18 countries of Central and West Africa show an average rate of 39% of ODF versus triggered 
communities (Bevan 2011), while in East Asia and Pacific a recent review over 12 countries showed a 
21% of success (UNICEF, 2013). In addition, evidence from some countries shows that achieving ODF 
status is not a guarantee of continued use and maintenance of hygienic latrines in the long-term 
(Evans et al, 2009); hence, CLTS can be seen as a process to eliminate open defecation, the first step 
in the “sanitation ladder” (WHO/UNICEF, no date). Difficulties are also encountered with the social 
marketing approach. The work of the World Bank in various countries shows that the development of 
supply services is at least as challenging as the generation of demand (Perez et al, 2012; Pedi et al, 
2012). As an example previous World Bank experience in Tanzania shows that around three-quarters 
of trained masons in rural areas became inactive almost immediately, around 20% were somehow 
active but did not have sanitation as principal income source, and below 5% of them were able to 
develop a sanitation business; for this they needed an “unusual mix of sales skills, technical ability, 
and dynamism” (Robinson, 2011).  
                                                          
2 A sanitation facility is considered “improved” if it hygienically separates human excreta from human contact. 
The types of technology that are likely to meet this criterion are: flush to piped sewer system; flush to septic 
tank; flush to pit; composting toilet; VIP latrine; pit latrine with a slab (WHO, 2006) 
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Some authors advocate that CLTS and marketing approaches are not only mutually compatible, but 
mutually complementary (Mukherjee et al, 2009). CLTS can be a powerful entry point for demand 
creation, which can be complemented with sanitation marketing approaches to offer villagers 
affordable sanitation options. The NSC in Tanzania combines these two approaches: demand is 
generated through CLTS techniques, while the supply of technical services would be guaranteed by 
supporting the development of rural private service providers (masons) for the construction of 
latrines.  
2. Materials and Methods  
2.1. Analytical framework  
In recent decades, the analysis of institutions and their evolution has won the attention of some 
eminent scholars (e.g.: Ostrom, 2005; North, 1990). The study of public administration, though 
included in the broader institutional analysis, has created a distinct body of research (Ostrom and 
Ostrom 1971). In this context political economy studies take the existing sector context as a starting 
point, and aim to better understand the political and economic realities and contexts, to give specific 
recommendations at country and sector level (ODI, 2011). By political economy, we understand the 
interaction of political and economic processes in a society, the distribution of power and wealth 
between different groups and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships 
over time (DFID, 2009). This framework is being increasingly applied in the water supply and 
sanitation sector to understand barriers to progress (Swatuk, 2008; WSP, 2011; Harris et al, 2011; 
Hueso and Bell, 2013).  
A variety of methodologies can be used for political economy analysis in the WASH sector (ODI, 
2011). For our study we have used the “Problem driven governance and political economy analysis” 
(PGPE) methodology (Fritz et al, 2009). It is composed of three steps: i) identifying the problem, 
opportunity or vulnerability to be addressed, (ii) mapping out the institutional and governance 
arrangements and weaknesses, and (iii) identifying obstacles to progressive change and understand 
ing where a ‘drive’ for positive change could emerge.  
 
In our case, the methodology is applied to a specific project: the National Sanitation Campaign in 
Tanzania. The object of analysis is the role of local government authorities (LGAs) in sanitation 
promotion. These LGAs are the district councils3, which are responsible for sanitation promotion 
according to the sanitation policy (GoT, 2011). In order to unpack the role of the district councils in 
the NSC, five main functions of project management have been chosen for analysis: a) Planning, b) 
Budgeting, c) Coordination, d) Implementation, and e) Monitoring, in coherence with the 
responsibilities of a district council stated in the policy (“planning, coordinating, implementing, 
monitoring and evaluating sanitation and hygiene activities”). 
 
Three key types of variable are commonly considered in PGPE analysis: structural factors, 
institutions, and actors (Fritz et al, 2009). Structural factors (the context) are beyond the direct 
control of the stakeholders concerned, and many such factors change only slowly over time. Under 
                                                          
3 Mainland Tanzania is administratively divided into regions, which are composed of districts, which are divided 
into wards containing villages and subvillages.  
 
5 
 
institutional variables we understand laws, and regulations, as well as informal rules; actors refer to 
the stakeholders who have some role or interest in the policy problem. Table 1 summarizes the 
methodology used, and provides detail on the specific focus of the analysis carried out for each 
variable. The object of PGPE analysis is to capture how these structural, institutional, and stakeholder 
variables interact and how they impact on the specific policy question analysed.  
 
[TABLE 1] 
Table 1. Synoptic table of the methodology used.  
Methodology for 
analysis  
Problem driven governance and political economy analysis 
Object of analysis The role of decentralized government (district authorities) in rural sanitation 
promotion according to the new sanitation policy and the national programme 
(National Sanitation Campaign) 
Variables of 
analysis  
 Structural factors: i) the evolution of sanitation promotion in the country, 
ii) the cultural values regarding sanitation among the population, and iii) 
the traditional mechanisms in place for leadership, accountability, 
solidarity, and collective action at village level.  
 Institutions: i) the characteristics of decentralization in place, ii) the 
sanitation policy and allocation of responsibilities for the Campaign, iii) the 
approach used for sanitation service delivery.  
 Actors: i) the district administration, ii) ward and village leaders, iii) village 
committees and groups, and iv) service providers at local level. 
Processes analyzed Main project management functions: 1) Planning, 2) Budgeting, 3) 
Coordination, 4) Implementation and 5) Monitoring  
 
2.2. Data collection 
The evidence of the role of local government in sanitation promotion draws from a specific 
information collection exercise during the first financial year of implementation of the NSC (mid 2012 
to mid 2013). After an extensive review of the policy documents, grey literature and research related 
to sanitation in Tanzania, we obtained information about the programme at national level, through 
interviews with officials of the ministries concerned and key non-governmental stakeholders. The 
analysis of sanitation promotion activities at local level is based on the assessment of six districts (42 
Districts were implementing the NSC at the time of the survey). The purposive sample included 
districts with an initially outstanding performance in the NSC, combined with others with regular or 
low performance. In each district, interviews were held with the district heads of department and the 
technicians dealing with sanitation issues in their daily work. Information was also collected at village 
level. Semi-structured interviews and group discussions were held with elected political 
representatives at ward, village and sub-village levels, and with governmental appointed officers at 
ward and village levels. The analysis of each district was completed through meetings and interviews 
with Non-Governmental Organizations, Community Based Organizations, village health workers, 
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members of sanitation follow-up committees, local masons, and random villagers that had attended 
triggering sessions. The vision from the regional level was obtained through interviews in the regional 
secretariats.  In total, 81 interviews or group discussions were carried out. Information was obtained 
from 3 regions, 6 districts, 9 wards and 15 villages. 12 interviews were held with institutions 
representative at national level, 8 at regional level, 26 at district level, and 35 at ward and village 
level. 
All the participants were clearly informed of the purpose of the research before the interviews. All 
except one accepted to take part on it. Confidentiality on individual opinions was granted, in order to 
obtain a more sincere opinion on the challenges of the on-going process.  
Most of the interviews were held in Swahili. Notes were taken during each interview and were 
compared within the research team before transcription. A reduced number of specialists, both 
practitioners and researchers, were used as key informants (Pelto, 1994). 
3. The context for sanitation in rural Tanzania  
Table 1 provides a brief description on the main topics analysed for each of the variables of the 
methodology used (structural, institutional, stakeholders). As these three layers of analysis overlap, 
results are now presented in a sequence that can facilitate its reading.  
3.1. Rural sanitation in Tanzania: history and governance  
Tanzania has a particular background as regards rural sanitation. It was promoted heavily during the 
1970s, through governmental public health campaigns, that were carried out at the same time as the 
resettlement, often forced, of dispersed rural smallholders to “Ujamaa” villages in the rural areas. As 
a result, the Mtu ni Afya “campaign” managed to increase coverage significantly, but this promotion 
of sanitation did not change people’s behaviour. Today, despite high coverage, most Tanzanian 
latrines are in very bad hygienic condition (Baker and Ensink, 2012).  The UN Joint Monitoring 
Programme estimates that only 7% of the rural population in Tanzania use improved sanitation 
facilities, 4% share their sanitation facilities with others, 73% use unimproved sanitation facilities, 
and 16% of the rural population practises open defecation (WHO/UNICEF, 2012).  
This poor situation has turned donors’ and governments’ attention to sanitation in recent years. One 
of the main outcomes is the elaboration of a Sanitation Policy (GoT, 2011). It is still a draft, but its 
contents are already guiding the sanitation promotion strategy in the country. This policy states that 
the ministry in charge of sanitation and hygiene issues is the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
(MoHSW), under its Environmental Health, Hygiene and Sanitation Department. The Ministry of 
Education and Vocational Training defines hygiene and sanitation promotion methodologies at 
schools, and decides on standards for school water and sanitation services.  The Prime Minister’s 
Office for Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG) is in charge of budget 
allocation, monitoring and supervision of Local Government Authorities. The Ministry of Water 
(MoW) is responsible for the Water Sector Development Plan (WSDP), which aims at raising water 
and sanitation coverage in the country.  
The rural sanitation policy is based on each family’s responsibility for provision of their own 
sanitation facilities (“every head of household will be responsible for promoting sanitation and 
hygiene in his family and ensure availability of sanitation facilities”) while the district council holds 
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the responsibility for “planning, coordinating, implementing, monitoring and evaluating sanitation 
and hygiene activities”.  
The operational programme of this Sanitation Policy is the National Hygiene and Sanitation Campaign 
(NSC), launched in 2012 for a three year period. It is aimed at ensuring that 1.3 million households 
improve their existing latrines or build new ones (e.g. an increase of 14% in national coverage) and 
the sanitation facilities of 700 schools all over the country by 2015, with an overall investment of 20 
million USD. During the first financial year (2012-2013), it targeted 100,000 households in 42 
districts.  
The NSC will stimulate demand and improve supply through a combination of CLTS and Sanitation 
Marketing. The programme for sanitation promotion at household level will be delivered by training 
facilitators from District staff to trigger CLTS, training masons to improve available services for latrine 
construction and upgrades, carrying out marketing and other campaigning events and establishing a 
rigorous monitoring system (GoT, 2012). The approach adopted by the NSC is taken from the Total 
Sanitation and Sanitation Marketing project  in Tanzania (TSSM), implemented between 2009 and 
2011 as part of the Global Scaling Up Rural Sanitation Project of the Water and Sanitation Program of 
the World Bank (http://www.wsp.org/global-initiatives/global-scaling-sanitation-project).   
3.2. Decentralization: understanding the District Councils   
Local government in the form of devolved arms of central government was present in Tanzania even 
before independence. It went through different periods of recentralization, including the abolition of 
local government authorities in 1972, in an attempt to give power to villages; but they were re-
established in the 1980s, due in part to the failure in provision of public services (Maro, 1990). The 
current government’s decentralization policy was outlined in the 1998 Policy Paper on Local 
Government Reform (GoT, 1998), which clearly sets out a policy of decentralization by devolution 
(‘D-by-D’). Devolution refers to a transfer of competencies from the central government to the 
district councils, which are distinct legal entities and should have wide autonomy.  
However this decentralization has few of the attributes of autonomy and local accountability which 
are at the core of the rationale for it (Shah, 1998). Intergovernmental transfers represent roughly 90 
percent of all local government spending (GoT, 2013), mainly to fund public services whose 
implementation is delegated: primary education, local health services, agricultural extension, water 
supply (including sanitation), and local road maintenance. In most cases, the central budget comes 
with specific guidelines for its use. Planning and budgeting at district level is performed through  
specific online software with strict central guidelines. Districts plan most of their activity on a 
“project basis”: each project comprises a list of activities with an associated budget and very limited 
flexibility, that has to be approved and is controlled from central level. As a result of this, officials at 
District level are primarily concerned with fulfilling the requirements of line ministries, which do not 
incentivize cooperation between district departments nor the adoption of locally adapted initiatives. 
Late disbursement of funds is a common problem (GoT, 2010), which, when combined with 
reductions in the district’s own revenues , can render a district virtually inactive.   
Another key aspect of decentralization in Tanzania has been the tense relationship between district 
councils´ technical staff and elected citizen’s representatives, characterized by a mutual lack of trust 
(Steffensen et al, 2004). The whole district administration, including the District Executive Director, 
Formatted: English (United States)
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the Heads of Department and district´s technicians are government employees. Ward and Village 
Executive Officers are also government workers. On the other hand, ward councillors and village and 
sub-village chairpersons are elected representatives. The main space of interaction of these 
appointed and elected groups is the District Full Council, a quarterly meeting with the presence of 
district heads of department and ward councillors, which in effect has a limited oversight role. 
Elected representatives at ward and village level have only limited impact on decision-making and 
implementation of plans and budgets, and virtually no power to hold district staff accountable for 
their performance (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010). This results in low downwards accountability from 
technical officers to local elected representatives and villagers in general. 
District and regional staff are not always sufficiently committed to serve their rural citizens; they 
usually cite the low level of understanding and education in the community as a barrier to progress. 
This is also reflected at institutional level in the transfer of funds. Districts should be transferring 20% 
of their own revenue to the villages for development activities, but this is rarely implemented, and 
not monitored or enforced from national level. There is general resistance to this from the districts, 
which argue that the accountability mechanisms at village level are limited and there is a risk of local 
political interference in the use of funds.  
In operational terms, per diems are probably the most important factor governing district officers´ 
behaviour, from heads of department to technicians. Per diems are part of the government payment 
system: district officers receive allowances when they visit the communities, independently of the 
outputs produced. Allowances involve such significant amounts relative to the salary of district 
officials in Tanzania (Therkildsen and Tidemand 2008), that they can distort how their activities are 
planned and implemented (Søreide et al, 2012). The allowances system is so strongly embedded in 
the culture of district technicians that no visits to communities will take place if the per diem is not 
secured.   
3.3. The village dynamics   
Villages are grouped administratively in wards. A ward typically comprises three to five villages, and a 
typical district has between twenty and forty wards. Ward councillors are the main link between the 
population and the District Council, and are chosen in national elections. Below this level, villages 
and sub-villages have elected chairpersons, who are selected in local elections. These posts do not 
receive a monthly salary. Paid staff of the district administration are present at ward and village level 
(the Executive Officers), who serve as communication link between the district council and village 
leaders. Villages are typically organized around sectoral committees;  Health, Education, Water and 
so on.  
Village leaders are aware of the allowances system of the Government, which represents 
considerable amount of money compared to the average villager’s income; this, added to the 
absence of salaries for elected representatives, explains their constant request for per diems for any 
activity to be carried out. Ordinary villagers are also aware of the system, being in most cases in 
disagreement with district officers receiving an additional payment just by “visiting the community”. 
Villagers feel further undervalued when free work is required from them, as part of some sort of 
“participatory process”. In the context of the villages visited, they were offered nothing or a symbolic 
amount (around 1/10 of the district staff allowance) for a day ‘s work. Significant conflicts around 
allowances had already taken place between district technicians and villagers.  
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Strong cohesion and peer solidarity mechanisms at community level are important for the 
achievement of ODF status. Since there are always vulnerable households for whom the construction 
of a latrine might be beyond their financial or physical capacity (e.g. elders living alone, disabled 
people, etc..), these safety networks are important to the success of the approach. In Tanzania, all 
experienced workers in the sector whom we consulted, as well as testimonies at village level 
affirmed that no peer solidarity mechanisms can be expected to assist vulnerable people within the 
communities, and that relatives (even those living outside the community concerned) constitute the 
safety network when someone needs specific support. Only in very exceptional cases would a person 
be supported with village funds or through community service work. 
 
4. The role of local government in the National Sanitation Campaign   
Table 2 presents our findings about the main activities carried out by each level of government in 
each of the main processes of the NSC. Villagers are also expected to undertake crucial activities on 
the process; hence an additional row for “population” has been included.   The only activity in the 
NSC that was planned to be outsourced outside the government was the design of campaign 
materials.  
[TABLE 2] 
Table 2. Functions at each government level in the main functions of the National Sanitation Campaign analysed.   
Level of 
governm’t  
Planning & budgeting Coordination Implementation Monitoring 
National  Select the districts 
Define budget and 
targets per district 
Criteria for selection of 
communities  
Inter-ministerial 
coordination committees 
Develop guidelines for 
implementation  
Organize national 
trainings 
(Develop promotion 
materials and messages) 
 
Collect national progress 
data quarterly and 
report to Donors  
Sporadic visits to some 
Districts 
Regional  Plan & budget for own 
supervision activities  
Collect district  plans and 
budgets 
No role Provide technical advice 
to Districts  
 
Collect regional progress 
data quarterly  
Regular monitoring visits  
(Promote knowledge 
management) 
District  Select communities for 
intervention  
Make a proposal of 
district budget and 
activities  
(Ensure synergies 
between actions at 
district level)   
Develop NSC schedule at 
local level with wards 
and villages 
Create awareness at 
village level  
Train masons  
Purchase moulds 
Conduct CLTS triggering 
session 
(Supervise masons) 
(Organize marketing 
events) 
Collect district progress 
data quarterly 
Train data takers at 
village level  
(Supervise ODF 
achievement)  
Ward No role No role  No role No role 
Village  No role Inform people of date of 
main meetings, 
promoting participation   
 
Select data takers for 
baseline 
Select masons to be 
trained  
Select follow-up 
committee 
Provide resources 
and/or transport for 
follow-up and data 
taking 
 
 
 
Population No role  No role  The “follow-up 
committee” should  visit  
households regularly 
Data takers collect 
baseline information and 
quarterly advances 
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after triggering   
 
 
Note: In brackets we represent actions that were planned but had not been carried out at the time of the survey 
4.1. Planning and budgeting  
The MoHSW selected the districts participating in the NSC for the financial year 2012-2013, set the 
targets per District and allocated the budget.  These districts were selected on a combination of 
criteria, namely low coverage of sanitation, and frequent outbreaks of diarrheal diseases.  
Communication to the districts concerned and main instructions were delivered through the Regional 
Health Officers at the regional secretariats. District Health Officers selected the target communities 
within their districts, following the same general criteria as used by the MoHSW. Districts did not 
want to choose very isolated or culturally challenging areas: they aimed at gaining confidence and 
experience before confronting the most difficult places. In all cases visited a balance of beneficiary 
communities between political constituencies was respected. The number of targeted households 
varied from less than 1,000 to more than 4,000 depending on the district, with an average target of 
2,381 HH per district.  The annual targets are expected to grow in the coming years, reaching on 
average 5% of the total population annually. The number of households covered by the NSC at 
District Level is higher than the target defined, since it is considered that not all of the households 
covered by the NSC will reach ODF status, in accordance with previous experience in the region 
(Bevan, 2011).  
The budget per household (HH) targeted is set at 10 USD (GoT, 2012); below reference costs for Sub 
Saharan Africa (15 USD/HH; Hickling and Bevan,2010), and Tanzania in particular (12 USD/HH, 
(Malebo and Makundi, 2012). For the 2012-2013 financial year, all districts visited had received a 
budget between 4.5 and 5 USD/HH targeted, which is approximately half of the budget foreseen per 
household. An approximate 0.5 USD/HH was allocated at regional level for supervision missions. The 
remaining budget is presumably spent on general coordination activities at central level, but 
information on expenditure at central level was not available. In the first year of the NSC, funds were 
not ready to use until six months after the start of the financial year, due to delays in transfers from 
central level. 
Each of the districts visited had a clear plan of activities with its associated budget. Costs at District 
level mainly consist of district staff allowances for each community visit (45% on average), and fuel 
(20%). Food and refreshments for the sessions, stationary and materials (especially moulds for 
casting slabs) complete it. Funds to incentivize villagers for specific tasks represented between 0 and 
5% of the foreseen budget in the districts visited (2% average). However, as shown in table 2, 
villagers had been allocated crucial and time consuming activities, such as the collection of database, 
the follow-up of a community action plan after triggering of demand, and quarterly check on 
progress. 
4.2. Coordination  
An inter-ministerial Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 2010 by the four ministries 
involved in sanitation promotion. As result, various working groups have been organized, which meet 
regularly with the presence of the main non-governmental stakeholders in the sector.  These working 
groups have not been replicated at local level, however.  
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In all districts visited, District Health Departments were effectively leading the NSC. A very strong 
sense of ownership of the process was found, with significant engagement of the staff including the 
District Health Officer (DHO). In the previous financial year (2011-2012) a nationwide training event 
was held, where district and regional health staff had been trained in CLTS for 5 days.  Adapted 
guidelines for CLTS triggering had also been produced and distributed.  As a result of this, DHOs were 
relatively confident on how to do sanitation promotion.  
Beyond general informative meetings, the flow of information between the Water, Education and 
Health departments was poor in general, as regards specific aspects where coordination could 
improve the impact of the programme. As a result¸ interventions in schools and communities often 
happened in different villages, or supply side activities for training masons often did not take account 
of previous interventions from the Water Department.  
The communities selected were normally informed of their participation in the NSC through a phone 
call to the village authorities. None of the villages had made any previous request or action to qualify 
for the programme. In some places this was followed by meetings with different ward and village 
committees to explain the campaign and gain their support. In general, the full involvement of village 
and ward leaders had not been achieved, and there was room for improvement.  
 
4.3. Implementation  
When it comes to implementation of the activities, the responsibilities are given to the District, which 
in turn delegates some critical activities to villagers (see Table 2). The key messages and promotional 
materials for the Campaign are produced and distributed at national level, while the Region has an 
advisory role, reinforced by quarterly monitoring visits.  
The activities which are the responsibility of the districts can be summarized as:  i) Awareness 
creation for ward and village leaders (already commented); ii) Baseline data collection; iii) Training of 
masons; iv) Triggering demand through CLTS; v) Follow-up of community action plans.  
The baseline data collection involved a household census with the basic data regarding sanitation 
and hand washing facilities, following a template developed by the MoHSW. All of the villages visited 
had done the baseline survey. In order to fill it, the commitment of one or two data takers per sub-
village was required, selected among villagers and trained for half a day by district technicians. In 
some places, data takers were paid up to 15,000 TZS (10 USD) for the exercise. No help with 
transport was provided by the District. However, regular sub-villages can have 100 households, and 
some had more than 300. Sometimes, small allowances for transport (e.g. taking a motorbike ride to 
one remote area) were provided by the village government. Around 25% of failure in the records was 
estimated by some district health workers; regional officers were supposed to check random 
questionnaires as part of their first monitoring visits. 40% of questionnaires checked in our survey 
were significantly wrong, though our sample cannot be considered as statistically representative. .  
 
The CLTS triggering exercise was carried out by district staff, usually with the personal involvement of 
the DHO. Triggering was done for a whole village in one day in most of the cases. Even though the 
MoHSW recommendation was to do the triggering by sub-village, this was not always respected due 
to lack of funds to pay for related costs. It has been observed that triggering is focused on the 
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improvement of latrines to specific standards (“not all latrines are valid”), consistent with the 
Tanzanian reality (high coverage of bad quality latrines), but different from the standard CLTS, which 
heavily supports local innovation and does not recommend promoting any specific type of latrine 
(Kar and Chambers, 2008). All communities where triggering had taken place had signed a “village 
declaration form to end open defecation” (as per MoHSW template), but only 20% of the villages 
visited had a clear and visible community action plan that could be consulted. In about 20% of places, 
triggering had been suspended because of low attendance. 
 
At the triggering session, a committee of eight villagers had been elected by the attendants to follow 
up the “village declaration”. The main mission of this committee is to visit house by house regularly 
and check the progress towards ODF status. No training, support, incentives (neither in cash or kind) 
or transport had been provided to this committee. It was found that these committees were either 
inactive or performing their duties with very poor quality. No clear routine follow-up tasks could be 
described by those involved in the committees.   
 
From the supply side, the activities related to selection and training of masons were weakly designed 
and implemented. The availability of capacities at village level was in general not taken into 
consideration.  The strategy was to: i) train one mason per village, proposed by the village leaders, 
who should provide sanitation services to villagers to their demand; ii) purchase some moulds, 
necessary to cast concrete slabs (around 20 for each District), which would be kept at the District 
Council’s premises and be borrowed from masons when needed. The NSC supplies these moulds 
since their cost (around US$50) and the lack of availability on the local market make their purchase 
beyond the capacity of the majority of village masons. Follow-up and regulation of masons´ activities 
was not perceived by district staff as part of their duties. In general, the purchase of sanitation 
services is considered as a free business transaction between the masons and their clients. At village 
level, it was found that many of the masons trained in the past did not carry out the expected 
activities when they came back to their villages. For all active masons met, these services did not 
constitute their main income generating activity. None of the masons interviewed knew where to 
buy a mould, or its price; nor had any intention to do that. In some cases, they had kept the moulds 
intended to be rotating. Masons were making the procurement of raw materials needed to fabricate 
slabs (cement, wire mesh, and aggregates). Most of them requested upfront payment from clients. 
As the cost of basic units of materials, e.g. a bag of cement, is more than the price of a slab, the 
potential customers had to organize themselves in groups, so that supplies could be bought by the 
mason without any expenditure from his side. This system creates additional difficulties for the 
potential clients, threatening the possibilities of success. Prices for san plat slabs were kept very 
affordable (US$ 3 to 5), but in the village with highest demand, the mason had increased his price to 
US$8. 
 
4.4. Monitoring 
District staff intended to follow up progress through mobile phone communication or taking 
advantage of other field trips scheduled to nearby areas. Funds were in general not enough to make 
specific follow-up visits. Regional Health Officers had also planned at least quarterly visits to the 
districts. The MoHSW was already undertaking visits to a sample of districts, checking the progress of 
the activities.  
13 
 
As regards the recording of progress against the baseline, this is supposed to be done quarterly using 
the same formats and procedure as the initial data collection, with the core of the work being carried 
out by villagers. The information should then be further aggregated at district, regional and national 
level.  
5. Adjusting the role of local government  
The high degree of ownership of the process and the commitment to sanitation found in the District 
Health Departments has no precedent in Tanzanian local government in the last two decades.  
Undoubtedly, the fact of having a national programme managed and directly implemented by the 
Government has a positive influence. This is an important reason for keeping some direct 
implementation functions and the whole responsibility of the programme within district 
governments. The key question is, which processes can be kept within the district authorities and 
which ones would benefit from the involvement of other stakeholders? 
The rigidity of the District budget and the important share of costs represented by staff per diems 
does not allow for a continuous and flexible interaction with the village level. At present, districts 
tend to focus their presence at village level as a one-off triggering session. As mentioned,  triggering  
has a positive effect on the district´s ownership and commitment towards the outputs of the process 
and can be planned as a specific activity, which fits well with the particularities of district planning. If 
this continues to be the case, additional training of Districts technicians would be necessary, given 
the importance of very good facilitation for the success of this approach (Peal et al, 2010;  Malebo 
and Makundi, 2012; Mukherjee, 2011). However, two important drawbacks need to be addressed. 
First,  the behaviour change expected is essentially a community process, so that a supportive 
attitude from local leaders is key to success (Musyoki, 2010). Achieving this local buy-in is crucial, and 
district technicians are unlikely to achieve this, due to general mutual lack of trust, and insufficient 
funds to ensure an adequate presence and respect for village timing. Secondly, the current method 
leaves the bulk of post-triggering support and supervision to a village follow-up committee 
constituted ad hoc at the triggering session and not trained. This contrasts with some of the keys for 
success of the CLTS approach, which in its origins required skilled facilitators to spend a large amount 
of time with the villagers on a regular basis (Allan, 2003), a requirement which is confirmed in studies 
of more recent programmes (Bevan, 2011; Malebo and Makundi, 2012). Hence, it might be more 
appropriate to use existing community-based resources such as Community Based Organizations 
(CBO) and/or Village Health Workers (VHW) to lead the relationship with the community from the 
outset, including routine data collection for monitoring of progress.  This would require an adequate 
prior training, and some kind of recognition, transport provision and monetary incentives (which can 
be partly based on the outputs achieved).  
On the supply side, the private sector is needed for providing affordable sanitation solutions to rural 
households. The development of entrepreneurship in this field is far from simple, and Tanzania is no 
exception. Hence, in the short term, active and competent part time masons with access to the 
necessary materials (especially casting moulds) can be the best service to aim for in many rural areas.  
In order to achieve this, the selection process of candidates based on their interest, the quality of 
training process and providing follow-up and support in the initial stages are crucial. These functions 
are not at the core of health departments’ capacities and also require regular on-site presence. 
Under these circumstances they could be better performed by vocational training institutions or 
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specialized service providers. The development of local sanitation entrepreneurship should be 
considered within a wider Local Economic Development approach. In addition, a strategy focused on 
starting the latrine promotion in semi-urban villages (Jenkins and Cairncross, 2009), could help to 
develop an incipient private sector that could later expand to more isolated villages. The access to 
credit either for masons or villagers is another challenge that needs to be addressed (Tremolet et al, 
2010).   
With the main functions of demand generation and supply support outsourced, district governments 
should be responsible for the management of the whole process, with special attention to three 
specific aspects: quality of monitoring, equity of outputs and regulation of service providers. The 
capacity of the CLTS approach to reach all, mobilising community solidarity mechanisms to assist 
vulnerable households, has worked in some places (Harvey, 2011) but cannot be considered as the 
general trend (UNICEF, 2013). Moreover, some breaches of individual rights have been reported due 
to the social pressure of achieving ODF status at community level (Bartram et al, 2012). Hence, 
ensuring an adequate approach and monitoring the equity of the campaign outputs should be a core 
function of local government, facilitating post implementation subsidies to vulnerable households if 
needed. The supervision of the service providers needs also to be addressed. Regulatory options in 
this context should rather be along the lines of recognition, dialogue, facilitation and collaboration 
(Samson, 2006), as support for private sector development.  
 
 
6. Conclusions  
This paper, dealing with the challenges of local government´s direct implementation of a sanitation 
programme, provides a context for the findings of the recent ( still unpublished) impact evaluation of  
its predecessor and pilot, the TSSM project implemented by the World Bank Water & Sanitation 
Program in 10 districts, which found only a marginal increase, around 10%, in sanitation coverage in 
intervention wards, and no detectable impact on open defecation, in spite of significant increases in 
awareness of the programme’s messages.  
More than that, it offers an analysis of key strengths and weaknesses of a hybrid policy approach 
(CLTS and Sanitation Marketing combined to deliver sanitation promotion through decentralized 
government) which is widespread in Sub-Saharan Africa and other regions with low sanitation 
coverage. This approach requires for its success the synergetic combination of very different 
elements: while demand creation aims at changing private behaviour and priorities through public 
health messages, the translation of this demand into better services requires government support 
and the involvement of informal service providers with rather different economic interests.  
The challenges identified in the case study are the result of a combination of technical weaknesses in 
the implementation of the adopted methodologies, the political economy of local government, and 
the economic and social particularities of rural areas, which are similar to other countries across the 
region. Hence, many of the constraints and recommendations indicated could be taken into 
consideration for similar programmes in other countries.   
Some of the challenges identified, such as the central control of local government or the limited 
accountability from these local governments towards rural villages are unlikely to change in the short 
term. The adjustments proposed to the role of local government (section 5)  take these elements 
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into consideration and are thus intended to be feasible, though are not enough to address all 
challenges. However, balancing the role of local government between direct execution, coordination 
and supervision of the sanitation promotion process could improve its outcomes significantly. These 
changes would require an increase in the budget (specially for village level activities), the 
engagement of other non-governmental stakeholders in demand and supply development, a 
strengthened monitoring process with a follow-up on the equity of outcomes, and the supportive 
regulation of service providers. Even if only modest success can be expected in the short term, the 
fact of having a government programme with some direct implementation, though not huge in scale, 
can bring about important differences in the national ownership of, and interest in rural sanitation, 
which are greatly needed.  
In addition, there is a need to keep working on different methodologies for sanitation promotion and 
their minimum resource requirements, since those now being widely adopted in new national 
policies for demand creation and to develop supply services are encountering significant challenges 
when implemented at scale.  
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